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ne of the central protections of our system of
criminal justice is the right of the accused in all
criminal prosecutions "to be confronted with
the witnesses against him." It provides assurance that
prosecution witnesses will give their testimony in the way
demanded for centuries by Anglo-American courts-in
the presence of the accused, subject to cross-examination-rather than in any other way. Witnesses may not,
for example, testify by speaking privately to governmental

eda

agents in a police station or in their living rooms.
Since shortly after it was adopted, however, the confrontation right became obscured by the ascendance of a
broader, but much weaker doctrine, the rule against hearsay. That rule is not limited to testimony-it applies to
any out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of
an assertion that it makes-but it has never been absolute.
Indeed, over time the expanding list of exemptions to the
rule has made it seem to be more hole than cheese.
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Apart from a significant loss of intellectual clarity, confounding the confrontation right with the rule
against hearsay did not at first create a problem: A court
that should have reached a given result by citing the confrontation right could (not necessarily would) do so by
citing the rule against hearsay. But in 1965, the US Supreme Court held that the confrontation right, expressed
in the Sixth Amendment to the US Constitution, is applicable to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. Now it became important for the Supreme Court
to have a theory of the confrontation right: Its rulings
under the confrontation clause bind the states, but the
states are free to design their own hearsay laws.
Not until 1980, in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980),
did the court attempt to enunciate a theory of the confrontation right. As elaborated in later cases, the Roberts
rule became a virtual constitutionalization of the rule
against hearsay as commonly applied in American courts.
Its breadth was as expansive as that of the hearsay rule.
But if a statement was deemed to fit within a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception, then the confrontation right did
not apply to it. And even if no well-established exception
applied, a statement might avoid condemnation under the
confrontation clause if it was supported by sufficient "indicia of reliability" a doctrine that closely conformed to
the so-called residual exception to the hearsay rule recognized by most American jurisdictions.
Confrontation doctrine under the Roberts regime was
essentially limp; a court disposed to admit an out-of-court
statement could usually articulate reasons why the statement was sufficiently reliable to be admissible. The problem was that under Roberts the confrontation clause did
not enunciate a value worthy of respect. If live testimony
of a witness to a given proposition would be more probative than prejudicial, then usually an out-of-court statement by that same person to the same proposition would
be as well; there is no reason to suppose that in general
jurors would so overvalue hearsay that their attempt to
determine the truth would be aided by shutting their eyes
and ears to potentially significant evidence. Accordingly,
if a court loses sight of the procedural principle enunciated by the confrontation clause-that live testimony before
the accused is the only acceptable manner in which prosecution witnesses may testify-then a court's temptation

will virtually always be to admit secondary evidence of an
out-of-court statement, without much regard to whether
it-was made in contemplation of litigation.
All that changed, dramatically, with Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). Crawford recognized
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that the confrontation clause does not state a general
rule about hearsay; rather, it addresses how prosecution
witnesses give their testimony. Crawford further recognized that within that realm the clause does not state
a flexible standard. Rather, it states a categorical rule:
Prosecution witnesses must give their testimony in the
presence of the accused, subject to cross-examination.
What is more, that confrontation must occur at trial, unless the witness is then unavailable and the accused has
had an opportunity at another time to be confronted
with and cross-examine the witness.
Though Justice Scalia's opinion in Crawfordwas revolutionary, it gained the acceptance of seven members of
the court, spanning the ideological spectrum. But Crawfordprovided only a framework. It left unanswered many
questions, most prominently how a court should determine whether a statement is testimonial.
Most Supreme Court cases since Crawford involving the confrontation clause have fallen into two groups
involving, respectively, accusatory statements made to
government officials and forensic laboratory results.
The law governing the first category has taken several
unfortunate turns. The majority opinions in the second
category have been on the mark, but they have been adopted in 5-4 votes.

Accusatory Statements and the'
Emergency"Doctrine

ngI

Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), decided two

cases, both of which involved accusations of domestic
violence made to governmental authorities shortly after
the alleged incident. I represented one of the petitioners and argued that a statement made to a known law
enforcement officer and accusing a person of a crime
should be considered per se testimonial. But the court
did not go so far. Instead in what appeared to be an
attempt to achieve consensus during a brief honeymoon
period at the beginning of Chief Justice Roberts's tenure-it enunciated a qualified test:
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the
course of police interrogation under circumstances
objectively indicating that the primary purpose of
the interrogation is to enable police assistance to
meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial
when the circumstances objectively indicate that
there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish
or prove past events potentially relevant to later
criminal prosecution.
(Id. at 822.)

Thus, in the case I argued, Hammon v. indiana, the
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accused's wife made the statement to a police officer in
the family living room while the accused was held at bay
in the kitchen. If the confrontation clause allowed the
statement to be admitted without her coming to court,
then we would have a system in which, by speaking to
the police in her living room, a person could knowingly
create evidence with the anticipation that it would be
used at trial against the person she accused. Eight members of the court agreed that this was an easy case and
that the clause barred use of the statement absent an opportunity for confrontation. Only Justice Thomas dissented. He pointed out-correctly, I believe-that the

Scalia dissented in an opinion that gave full vent to his
passionate disagreement. Justice Ginsburg also dissented, more briefly and with more restraint. Justice Kagan,
who as solicitor general had put her name on an amicus
brief supporting the state, recused herself.
The Bryant majority adhered to the "primary purpose" test. Justice Scalia applied a formulation that I believe is much better-whether the understanding at the
time of the statement was "that it may be used to invoke
the coercive machinery of the State against the accused."
(Id. at 1169.) But the difference between a purpose-based
test and an anticipation-based test was not crucial to

'primary purpose" test was riddled with ambiguity. But
he contended that the statement was not sufficiently formal to be deemed testimonial. I believe that this argument misses the essential function of the clause, which
is to ensure that testimony is given under proper-and
formal-conditions.
The other case, Davis itself, involved conversation
with a 911 operator, begun while the accused was still
in the house. Throughout the call, the complainant was
in obvious distress and the accused remained at large.
Unanimously, the court held that this statement was not
testimonial; the majority concluded that it was made for
the primary purpose of addressing the emergency that
led to the 911 call.
Davis left open the questions of how broadly the
court would treat the "ongoing emergency" doctrine and
how it would go about trying to determine what was the
"primary purpose" of an interrogation. In Michigan v.
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, decided in February 2011, the
court began to give answers. The case centered on statements made by a shooting victim, Anthony Covington,
while lying badly wounded on the pavement outside a
gas station. Covington told each of several police officers as they arrived on the scene that he had been shot
through a door by Bryant, half an hour earlier and six
blocks away. Several hours later, Covington died of his
wounds; there was no proof, however, that at the time he
made his statements he anticipated imminent death.
Five justices, in an opinion by Justice Sotomayor, held
that these statements were made for the purpose of addressing the emergency created by the shooting. Justice
Thomas concurred, again objecting to the "primary
purpose" test but continuing to insist that only formally
made statements could qualify as testimonial. Justice

resolve Bryant. What was crucial was this question:
From whose perspective should a court make the relevant assessment? Justice Scalia believed-correctly, in
my view-that the decision should be made from the
point of view of the speaker, the person who is assertedly
a witness for purposes of the confrontation clause. But
the majority chose what it called "a combined inquiry
that accounts for both the declarant and the interrogator." (Id. at 1160.) To the extent that the majority meant
simply that the apparent purpose of a police questioner
is an important fact in determining what the speaker's
understanding of the situation was, this seems reasonable enough. But the majority seemed, at least at times,
to be saying that the purpose of a questioner is itself a
critical determinant of whether a statement is testimonial. That view is troublesome. The questioner is not a
witness; indeed, sometimes a witness makes a testimonial statement without any questioner at all. Furthermore,
the test is highly manipulable; police interrogators can
always claim that as they began questioning they were
focusing on how little they knew of the situation and on
how the aim of any officer in such a situation would be
first and foremost to ensure the public safety. Furthermore, the majority never really answered a sharp question posed by Justice Scalia: What if the questioner and
the speaker have completely different purposes or understandings of the situation?
Bryant itself illustrated such a possible divergence.
The majority concentrated its discussion mainly on the
police officers, for as they arrived at the scene they knew
little or nothing of what was going on. But Covington
knew full well what had happened. Though badly hurt,
he was perfectly coherent. He knew that nothing he said
in describing the shooting could plausibly relieve his
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dire medical condition. And he knew that Bryant was
his drug dealer of long standing; he had no reason to
believe that Bryant was on a rampage, likely to shoot
others in the near future. Justice Scalia seems on firm
ground in concluding that Bryant must have known that
he was invoking the power of the state against the man
who he said had shot him, and that must have been his
purpose in making the statement.
Suppose Covington had survived the attack and lived
around the corner from the courthouse where the trial
was held. Under the majority's analysis, that would not
matter: The state could prove its case based on the statements Covington made to the police while lying outside
the gas station, and, so far as the confrontation clause
is concerned, the state would never have to bring him to
trial or any formalproceeding.
That Covington died hours after making his accusations must have made much more appealing a ruling that
would allow them to be admitted into evidence. But, had
Justice Scalia not overplayed his hand three years earlier,
there might have been a far more satisfactory route to
achieving the same result. There was considerable, though
not necessarily overwhelming, evidence that Bryant had
indeed killed Covington; if so, and given that there was
no time to arrange for a deposition, Bryant's own intentional wrongful act was the cause of his inability to crossexamine Covington. Thus, a court might have held that
Bryant forfeited the confrontation right-except that the
Supreme Court foreclosed this possibility in Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008), when it held, in an opinion by
Justice Scalia, that an accused does not forfeit the right by
killing a witness unless he does so for the purpose of rendering the witness unavailable to testify. I expressed fear
at the time of Giles that courts would compensate for it in
part by adopting narrow conceptions of the class of testimonial statements, and now I am afraid that the Supreme
Court itself has validated that prediction.
One more aspect of Bryant is potentially troublesome.
Justice Sotomayor wrote, "In making the primary purpose determination, standard rules of hearsay, designed
to identify some statements as reliable, will be relevant."
(131 S.Ct. at 1155.) Does this suggest a desire on her part
to restore the ancien regime of Ohio v. Roberts? That is
to know what
hard to believe, but if not it was difficult
to make of this language. Some basis for relief appeared
in a concurrence by Justice Sotomayor mn the second
confrontation clause case of the last term, Builcoming v.
New Mexico, toward which we now turn.
In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 5. Ct. 2527
(2009), Justice Scalia, for a bare majority of the court,
adopted what he called "a rather straightforward ap-

plication" of Crawford: A forensic lab report prepared
for use in prosecuting a crime, in that case attesting that
a given substance contained cocaine, was a testimonial
statement subject to the confrontation clause. Four justices-the same four that later concurred in Justice Sotomayor's opinion in Bryant (the chief justice and Justices
Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito)-issued a pained dissent,
written by Justice Kennedy, emphasizing what they
feared the practical consequences of the decision would
be. They were not assuaged by Justice Scalia's assurance
that "the best indication that the sky will not fall [as a
result of the decision] is that it has not done so already,"
given that "there is no evidence that the criminal justice
system has ground to a halt in the States that, one way
or another, empower a defendant to insist upon the analyst's appearance at trial." (Id. at 2540-41.)
Indeed, the four did not give up readily. Just a few days
after Melendez-Diaz came down, the court granted certiorari in a case that it had been holding pending that decision,
Briscoe v. Virginia. In Briscoe, the state argued that it did

not have to bring the author of the report to trial because
the accused could have invoked a statute providing that he
could call the author to trial as his own witness. The curious aspect of the certiorari grant was that the court had
apparently just decided the issue, rejecting the contention
by Massachusetts in Melendez-Diaz that the accused's constitutional right to call the author as a witness obviated the
confrontation clause problem. There was widespread speculation that the four dissenters hoped to take a quick crack
at Melendez-Diaz; Justice Souter, a member of the majority
in that case, had announced his retirement, and Sonia Sotomayor, already nominated to replace him, was a former
prosecutor. But at argument, held after she had taken her
seat, it became apparent that she was not about to limit or
discard Melendez-Diaz, and the court did what most observers had originally expected it to do, vacate and remand
the case for reconsideration in light of that decision.
But this was nowhere near the end of the story. Bullcoining v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011), decided

this past June, was the court's third encounter with the
confrontation clause ramifications of forensic lab reports.
Bullcoming involved a prosecution for driving while intoxicated; the results of a blood test were necessar-y to prove
an aggravated form of the offense. In this case, unlike Melendez-Diaz and Briscoe, the prosecution presented a live
witness from the lab rather than simply the report. But
Curtis Caylor, the analyst who had actually performed the
test, was on unpaid administrative leave, and the state did
not bring him to court. Instead, it presented the testimony of Gerasimos Razatos, a supervisor who could speak
from personal knowledge about the lab's procedures but
who had not participated in or observed performance of
any part of the test on Bullcoming' blood.
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Once again, the wait for a decision was made more
interesting by the fact that a member of the MelendezDiaz majority, in this case Justice Stevens, had retired
and been replaced by a new justice whose background
suggested the possibility that she might join the Melendez-Diaz dissenters; as solicitor general, Justice Kagan
had supported the state in Briscoe. But once again the
new justice joined the majority, and the Melendez-Diaz
dissenters remained a minority of four, once again with
Justice Kennedy writing for them.
Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion. That in
itself is interesting, because she received the assignment
from Justice Scalia, the senior justice in the majority and
the author of the majority opinions in Crawford, Davis,
Giles, and Melendez-Diaz. Justice Scalia's decision not
to keep the opinion himself may have been determined
by workload factors-but it may also have reflected recognition, after Bryant, that he was not persuading his
colleagues sufficiently on confrontation clause issues.
The majority concluded rather easily on the basis of
Melendez-Diaz that Caylor's report was testimonial; "[i]n all
material rspects," the court wrote, the reports in the two
cases resembled each other. (131 S. Ct. at 2717.) The
New Mexico Supreme Court had not denied this conclusion, but it had nevertheless held that the clause did not
apply to Caylor's report, because he had transcribed the
results of a gas chromatograph machine without offering any additional interpretation. Thus, it regarded him
as "a mere scrivener," the true accuser being the machine
itself But Justice Ginsburg's opinion rejected this theory
outright. Caylor's report did more than repeat numbers
yielded by the machine; it amounted to a certification of
the entire manner in which the test was conducted. More
significantly, Justice Ginsburg emphasized, most witnesses testify to their observation of factual conditions
or events such as "the light was green"-without additional interpretation; the confrontation clause applies
to such testimony, and lab analysts are no different in
this regard from other witnesses.
The New Mexico court had also held that Razatos
could substitute for Caylor because he was qualified
to testify about the machine and the laboratory's procedures. No, said Justice Ginsburg. Razatos could not
testify to what Caylor knew-not only about the test but
about why Caylor had been put on unpaid leave. And.
"[m]ore fundamentally,... [t]he Clause does not tolerate
dispensing with confrontation simply because the court
believes that questioning one witness about another's
testimonial statements provides a fair enough opportunity for cross-examination." (Id. at 2708.)
Speaking just for herself and Justice Scalia, Justice
Ginsburg added a discussion demonstrating once again
that "°dire consequences" were unlikely to follow from rig-

orous protection of the confrontation right. Among other
points, she emphasized that retesting of samples would
often obviate the need for the original analyst to come to
trial; Razatos could simply have conducted his own test
and testified from personal knowledge about that. And,
as the court had in Melendez-Diaz, she endorsed the constitutionality of notice-and-demand statutes, which provide that an accused waives the confrontation right with
respect to a forensic lab report if the accused is given notice of the prosecution's intent to introduce the report but
does not demand that the analyst testify live.
Once again, the four dissenters were not comforted.
Justice Ginsburg noted that their objection was "less to
the application of the Court's decisions in Crawfordand
Melendez-Diaz to this case than to those pathmarking
decisions themselves." (Id. at 2713 n.5.) Indeed, Justice
Kennedy's opinion contained the dark intimation that
"the Crawfordapproach was not preordained," and suggested that "[t]he persistent ambiguities in the Court's
approach are symptomatic of a rule not amenable to
sensible applications." (Id. at 2726, 2728.) Are the four
prepared to get rid of Crawford altogether? That is difficult to say, but Justice Kennedy claimed that Bryant
stood for the proposition that "reliability [is] an essential
part of the constitutional inquiry." (Id. at 2725.)
That statement generated a response from Justice Sotomayor, the author of Bryant. The decision in that case,
she said, "deemed reliability, as reflected in the hearsay
rules, to be 'relevant,' not 'essential."' (Id. at 2720 n.1
(citation omitted).) How relevant? She explained that in
some circumstances the treatment of a given statement
under the hearsay rules has "confirmed" a decision as to
whether the statement should be deemed to be litigationoriented and so testimonial for confrontation clause
purposes. But that is a long way away from the Roberts
approach, which treated reliability as the governing standard and the hearsay rules as a principal determinant of
reliability. As Justice Sotomayor explained: "The rules
of evidence, not the Confrontation Clause, are designed
primarily to police reliability; the purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to determine whether statements are
testimonial and therefore require confrontation." (Id.)
Justice Sotomayor also highlighted several factual circumstances not presented by the case. It was not a case
in which any nonlitigation purpose was suggested for the
report. Nor did the in-court witness have "a personal, albeit limited, connection to the scientific test at issue." (Id.
at 2722.) Nor was the testifying expert "asked for his independent opinion about underlying testimonial reports
that were not themselves admitted into evidence." (Id.)
And this was "not a case in which the State introduced
only machine~generated results, such as a printout from a
gas chromatograph." (Id)
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The court will have a further chance to test the limits of Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming soon enough. Five
days after it decided Bullcoming, the court granted certiorari in Williams v. Illinois, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (2011), yet
another case involving the confrontation clause ramifications of forensic lab reports. In Williams, an in-court expert testified that two DNA profiles matched; one of them
was reported by an out-of-state lab, from which no witness came to testify at trial. That lab's report was not introduced, but the essence of it-the deduction of a DNA
profile that, according to both a computer program and
the in-court expert, matched that of the accused-was
made clearly known to the judge, sitting as trier of fact. It
seems likely that the four justices who dissented in the first
two cases will be eager to approve the procedure used in
Williams. It remains to be seen whether the five members
of the Bullcoming majority will all recognize that the outof-state lab report was a testimonial statement, that part
of its substance was effectively presented to the judge, and
that this substance provided no support for the expert's
opinion unless it was true; that the expert added input of
her own to form her opinion does not negate the fact that
testimonial assertions made by an absent lab analyst were
a crucial part of the prosecution's case.
For now, in any event, Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming
remain the law, and those states that assumed they could
prove forensic lab results simply by introducing pieces of
paper or by presenting the testimony of surrogate witnesses will have to adjust. In many cases, defendants will
stipulate to the admissibility of the report-as they do
in states that always adhered to the rule now established
as a matter of constitutional law by these two cases. Beyond that, though, more states might adopt notice-anddemand statutes-perhaps including a provision that
an analyst who appears ready to testify will do so, thus
diminishing the accused's incentive to make the demand
simply to impose cost on the prosecution, with the intention of stipulating to admissibility if the analyst appears.
Another approach to limit such manipulative demands
(but one of uncertain constitutionality) may be to tax
against an accused who has been convicted and is not
indigent the cost of the analyst's appearance; statutory
authorization for such taxation, which was unknown at
the common law, is already on the books in some states,
as well as the federal jurisdiction. Even absent statutory provisions, prosecutors might attempt to limit such
game-playing on their own, by adopting a policy that
they will not stipulate to admissibility of the report once
the analyst appears prepared to testify. States might also
find ways to satisfy the accused's confrontation rights
more efficiently than they do now. For example, if the
original analyst is unavailable, often another analyst
could economically retest the sample and then testify at
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trial. Or states might arrange for lab witnesses to give
testimony in multiple cases on a given day, perhaps
by deposition. They might set up facilities in labs that
would enable analysts to testify by video in many cases,
on consent of the accused, without the need to travel. In
some cases, they might find it advantageous to rearrange
the structure of the lab operation-perhaps relying on
smaller labs better distributed around the state, perhaps
integrating their processes so fewer technicians are involved in any given test.
The Uncertain Path Ahead
And so we have come to a curious juncture. The court
has adopted an awkward "primary purpose" test, at least
for interrogations. In applying that test, it has taken an
unfortunate perspective, dependent in large part on the
intent of the questioner. This may make its rather expansive view of the "ongoing emergency" doctrine highly
manipulable. A robust forfeiture doctrine might have created a backdrop against which the court could develop a
sound doctrine governing the determination of whether a
statement is testimonial, but at least for now the court has
barred that possibility. Meanwhile, four justices are suggesting that perhaps they are ready to abandon the whole
project, and return to something like the reliability-based
Roberts regime, which the court recently rejected after
25 years of failure. And one more justice severely limits
the reach of the confrontation right, which was meant
to protect the conditions in which testimony is given, by
refusing to recognize it unless the statement in question
is already characterized to a considerable degree by the
formality that is one of those conditions. And yet, in the
context of formal statements, even reports on routinely
performed lab tests, a majority of the court still adheres
to the principle that our criminal justice system gives an
accused the right to insist that those who make statements
creating evidence against the individual do so face-to-face
and subject to cross-examination.
So how will this all turn out? I am loath to make predictions in the short run. In the long run, I believe that the
court will adopt a sound view of what is testimonial, based
on the reasonable anticipation of a person in the position
of the speaker, and that its ability to develop a strong confrontation right will be fostered by development of a strong
forfeiture doctrine. My principal reason for believing this
is that I believe that over time the wrong turns the court
has taken will become painfully obvious, It was clear after
Crawford that construction of a durable framework built
on its foundation would take several years at least. But now
it appears the process may take decades, at least. Too bad,
but, oh well. The confrontation right has been around for
centuries, and will be for centuries to come. If it takes a
while longer to get it right, so be it. [
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